# 1NC v Houston FL – R4 Harvard

### 1NC

#### Interpretation: The resolution should define the division of ground- the role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### The ‘United States federal government’ is the three branches.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### The resolution is a proposition of policy – “United States” and “should” prove

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Core antitrust laws refer to statutory laws – the increased prohibitions must be reflected IN Clayton, Sherman and FTC

Kuntz 2-23-21

(Kendall. MARYLAND CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW. Can the Courts and New Antitrust Laws Break Up Big Tech? https://www.law.umaryland.edu/Programs-and-Impact/Business-Law/JBTLOnline/Break-Up-Big-Tech/)

There are three core antitrust laws in effect today: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These three antitrust laws attempt to protect market competition for the benefit of consumers. The Sherman Act outlaws monopolies and contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. Lastly, the Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Antitrust laws are not established to punish success, but are focused on preventing anticompetitive effects, exclusionary practices, reduced consumer choice, and hindered innovation.

#### C. Two impacts:

#### 1. Clash: Debate requires negation- affirmatives that don’t address the resolution makes irrative clash impossible because shifting away from the resolutional agent and mechanism kills negative ground by making it concessionary and allows for aff conditionality which cements the structural advantages of the affirmative through crushing limits.

#### 2. Fairness- debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics – they allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage, because all the aff has to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world – this crushes clash because all of our prepared negative strategies are based on praxis, and by not defending a clear actor and mechanism we lose 90% of negative ground, and the aff still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible

### 1NC

#### Vote affirmative to endorse a refusal of debt as a regulation on Capital’s anti-competitive business practices, except for white debt to black folk.

#### Only by considering white debt can we uncover legacies of violence – failure to engage in discussions of white debt sustains neoliberal capital and hierarchized violence.

Biss 15 [Eula, “White Debt Reckoning with what is owed — and what can never be repaid — for racial privilege,” 12/02/15, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/magazine/white-debt.html>, JCR]

‘‘The Condition of Black Life is One of Mourning’’ is the title of an essay Claudia Rankine wrote for The New York Times Magazine after the Charleston church massacre. Sitting with her essay in front of me, I asked myself what the condition of white life might be. I wrote ‘‘complacence’’ on a blank page. Hearing the term ‘‘white supremacist’’ in the wake of that shooting had given me another occasion to wonder whether white supremacists are any more dangerous than regular white people, who tend to enjoy supremacy without believing in it. After staring at ‘‘complacence’’ for quite a long time, I looked it up and discovered that it didn’t mean exactly what I thought it meant. ‘‘A feeling of smug or uncritical satisfaction with oneself or one’s achievements’’ might be an apt description of the dominant white attitude, but that’s more active than what I had in mind. I thought ‘‘complacence’’ meant sitting there in your house, neither smug nor satisfied, just lost in the illusion of ownership. This is an illusion that depends on forgetting the redlining, block busting, racial covenants, contract buying, loan discrimination, housing projects, mass incarceration, predatory lending and deed thefts that have prevented so many black Americans from building wealth the way so many white Americans have, through homeownership. I erased ‘‘complacence’’ and wrote ‘‘complicity.’’ I erased it. ‘‘Debt,’’ I wrote. Then, ‘‘forgotten debt.’’ I read several hundred pages of ‘‘Little House on the Prairie’’ to my 5-year-old son one day when he was home sick from school. Near the end of the book, when the Ingalls family is reckoning with the fact that they built their little house illegally on Indian Territory, and just after an alliance between tribes has been broken by a disagreement over whether or not to attack the settlers, Laura watches the Osage abandoning their annual buffalo hunt and leaving Kansas. Her family will leave, too. At this point, my son asked me to stop reading. ‘‘Is it too sad?’’ I asked. ‘‘No,’’ he said, ‘‘I just don’t need to know any more.’’ After a few moments of silence, he added, ‘‘I wish I was French.’’ The Indians in ‘‘Little House’’ are French-speaking, so I understood that my son was saying he wanted to be an Indian. ‘‘I wish all that didn’t happen,’’ he said. And then: ‘‘But I want to stay here, I love this place. I don’t want to leave.’’ He began to cry, and I realized that when I told him ‘‘Little House’’ was about the place where we live, meaning the Midwest, he thought I meant it was about the town where we live and the house we had just bought. Our house is not that little house, but we do live on the wrong side of what used to be an Indian boundary negotiated by a treaty that was undone after the 1830 Indian Removal Act. We live in Evanston, Ill., named after John Evans, who founded the university where I teach and defended the Sand Creek massacre as necessary to the settling of the West. What my son was expressing — that he wants the comfort of what he has but that he is uncomfortable with how he came to have it — is one conundrum of whiteness. ‘‘Tell me again about the liar who lied about a lie,’’ my son said recently. It took me a moment to register that he meant Rachel Dolezal. He had heard me talking about her with Noel Ignatiev, author of ‘‘How the Irish Became White.’’ I had said: ‘‘She might be a liar, but she’s a liar who lied about a lie. The original fraud was not hers.’’ Because I was talking to Noel, who sent me to James Baldwin’s essay ‘‘On Being White ... and Other Lies’’ when I was in college, I didn’t have to clarify that the lie I was referring to was the idea that there is any such thing as a Caucasian race. Dolezal’s parents had insisted to reporters that she was ‘‘Caucasian’’ by birth, though she is not from the Caucasus region, which includes contemporary Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Outside that context, the word ‘‘Caucasian’’ is a flimsy and fairly meaningless product of the 18th-century pseudoscience that helped invent a white race. Whiteness is not a kinship or a culture. White people are no more closely related to one another, genetically, than we are to black people. American definitions of race allow for a white woman to give birth to black children, which should serve as a reminder that white people are not a family. What binds us is that we share a system of social advantages that can be traced back to the advent of slavery in the colonies that became the United States. ‘‘There is, in fact, no white community,’’ as Baldwin writes. Whiteness is not who you are. Which is why it is entirely possible to despise whiteness without disliking yourself. Sign up for The New York Times Magazine Newsletter The best of The New York Times Magazine delivered to your inbox every week, including exclusive feature stories, photography, columns and more. Get it sent to your inbox. When he was 4, my son brought home a library book about the slaves who built the White House. I didn’t tell him that slaves once accounted for more wealth than all the industry in this country combined, or that slaves were, as Ta-Nehisi Coates writes, ‘‘the down payment’’ on this country’s independence, or that freed slaves became, after the Civil War, ‘‘this country’s second mortgage.’’ Nonetheless, my overview of slavery and Jim Crow left my son worried about what it meant to be white, what legacy he had inherited. ‘‘I don’t want to be on this team,’’ he said, with his head in his hands. ‘‘You might be stuck on this team,’’ I told him, ‘‘but you don’t have to play by its rules.’’ Even as I said this, I knew that he would be encouraged, at every juncture in his life, to believe wholeheartedly in the power of his own hard work and deservedness, to ignore inequity, to accept that his sense of security mattered more than other people’s freedom and to agree, against all evidence, that a system that afforded him better housing, better education, better work and better pay than other people was inherently fair. My son’s first week in kindergarten was devoted entirely to learning rules. At his school, obedience is rewarded with fake money that can be used, at the end of the week, to buy worthless toys that break immediately. Welcome to capitalism, I thought when I learned of this system, which produced, that week, a yo-yo that remained stuck at the bottom of its string. The principal asked all the parents to submit a signed form acknowledging that they had discussed the Code of Conduct with their children, but I didn’t sign the form. Instead, my son and I discussed the civil rights movement, and I reminded him that not all rules are good rules and that unjust rules must be broken. This was, I now see, a somewhat unhinged response to the first week of kindergarten. I know that schools need rules, and I am a teacher who makes rules, but I still want my son to know the difference between compliance and complicity. For me, whiteness is not an identity but a moral problem. Becoming black is not the answer to the problem of whiteness, though I sympathize with the impulse, as does Noel. ‘‘Imagine the loneliness of those who, born to a group they regard as unjust and oppressive and not wanting to be part of that group, are left on their own to figure their way out,’’ Noel wrote recently in his own narrative, ‘‘Passing,’’ the story of how he left a lower-middle-class family and a college education to work in factories for the next 23 years. I met Noel after he left the factories for Harvard, when he was the editor, with John Garvey, of a journal called Race Traitor. In it, I read about groups of volunteers who worked in shifts using video cameras to record police misconduct in their cities. I read about the school-board member who challenged the selection practices that had produced, in a district where only 22 percent of the students were white, a gifted program in which 81 percent of the students were white. Race Traitor articulated for me the possibility that a person who looks white can refuse to act white, meaning refuse to collude with the injustices of the law-enforcement system and the educational system, among other things. This is what Noel called ‘‘new abolitionism.’’ John Brown was his model, and the institution he was intent on abolishing was whiteness. It was because I read Race Traitor in my 20s that I stopped, in my 30s, when I saw a black man being handcuffed by his car on an empty stretch of road next to a cemetery in Chicago. I was carrying my son, who was 2, on the back of my bicycle. ‘‘What do you want?’’ the police officer yelled at me, already irritated, as soon as I stopped. ‘‘I’m just watching,’’ I said. ‘‘Just being a witness.’’ I didn’t yet own a phone that could record video. He took a few threatening steps toward me, yelling about what I would do differently in his situation if I was so smart. My son was scared and began to cry. The officer kept barking at me. When my son broke into a loud wail, I memorized the number on the back of the police van and left. I now wonder what I thought I was going to do with that number: report the police to the police? By the time I got back to my apartment, my hands were still shaking, I had forgotten the number and I was dismayed with myself. Refusing to collude in injustice is, I’ve found, easier said than done. Collusion is written onto our way of life, and nearly every interaction among white people is an invitation to collusion. Being white is easy, in that nobody is expected to think about being white, but this is exactly what makes me uneasy about it. Without thinking, I would say that believing I am white doesn’t cost me anything, that it’s pure profit, but I suspect that isn’t true. I suspect whiteness is costing me, as Baldwin would say, my moral life. And whiteness is costing me my community. It is the wedge driven between me and my neighbors, between me and other mothers, between me and other workers. I know there’s more too. I have written and erased a hundred sentences here, trying and failing to articulate something that I can sense but not yet speak. Like a bad loan, the kind in which the payments increase over time, the price of whiteness remains hidden behind its promises. ‘‘Her choice to give up whiteness was a privilege,’’ Michael Jeffries wrote of Dolezal in The Boston Globe. Noel said to me, ‘‘If giving up whiteness is a privilege, what do you call hanging on to it?’’ As Dolezal surrendered her position in the N.A.A.C.P. and lost her teaching job, I thought of the white police officers who killed unarmed black people and kept their jobs. That the penalty for disowning whiteness appears to be more severe than the penalty for killing a black person says something about what our culture holds dear. The moral concept of Schuld (‘‘guilt’’), Nietzsche wrote, ‘‘descends from the very material concept of Schulden (‘debts’).’’ Material debt predates moral debt. The point he is making is that guilt has its source not in some innate sense of justice, not in God, but in something as base as commerce. Nietzsche has the kind of disdain for guilt that many people now reserve for ‘‘white guilt’’ in particular. We seem to believe that the crime is not investing in whiteness but feeling badly about it. Even before I started reading Nietzsche, I had the uncomfortable suspicion that my good life, my house and my garden and the ‘‘good’’ public school my son attends, might not be entirely good. Even as I painted my walls and planted my tomatoes and attended parent-teacher conferences last year, I was pestered by the possibility that all this was built on a bedrock of evil and that evil was running through our groundwater. But I didn’t think in exactly those terms because the word ‘‘evil’’ is not usually part of my vocabulary — I picked it up from Nietzsche. ‘‘Evil’’ is how slaves describe their masters. In Nietzsche’s telling, Roman nobles called their way of life ‘‘good,’’ while their Jewish slaves called the same way of life ‘‘evil.’’ The invention of the concept of evil was, according to Nietzsche, a kind of power grab. It was an attempt by the powerless to undermine the powerful. More power to them, I think. But Nietzsche and I disagree on this, among other things. Like many white people, he regards guilt as a means of manipulation, a killjoy. Those who resent the powerful, he writes, use guilt to undermine their power and rob them of their pleasure in life. And this, I believe, is what makes guilt potentially redemptive. Guilt is what makes a good life built on evil no longer good. I have a memory of the writer Sherman Alexie cautioning me against this way of thinking. I remember him saying, ‘‘White people do crazy [expletive] when they feel guilty.’’ That I can’t dispute. Guilty white people try to save other people who don’t want or need to be saved, they make grandiose, empty gestures, they sling blame, they police the speech of other white people and they dedicate themselves to the fruitless project of their own exoneration. But I’m not sure any of that is worse than what white people do in denial. Especially when that denial depends on a constant erasure of both the past and the present. Once you’ve been living in a house for a while, you tend to begin to believe that it’s yours, even though you don’t own it yet. When those of us who are convinced of our own whiteness deny our debt, this may be an inevitable result of having lived for so long in a house bought on credit but never paid off. We ourselves have never owned slaves, we insist, and we never say the n-word. ‘‘It is as though we have run up a credit-card bill,’’ Coates writes of Americans, ‘‘and, having pledged to charge no more, remain befuddled that the balance does not disappear.’’ A guilty white person is usually imagined as someone made impotent by guilt, someone rendered powerless. But why not imagine guilt as a prod, a goad, an impetus to action? Isn’t guilt an essential cog in the machinery of the conscience? When I search back through my correspondence with Sherman Alexie, I find him insisting that we can’t afford to disempower white people because we need them to empower the rest of us. White people, he proposes, have the political power to make change exactly because they are white. I once feared buying a house because I didn’t want to be owned. I had saved money with no purpose in mind other than the freedom to do whatever I wanted. Now I’m bound to this house, though I’m still free to lose it if I choose. But that isn’t the version of freedom that interests me at the moment. I’m more compelled by a freedom that would allow me to deserve what I have. Call it liberation, maybe. If debt can be repaid incrementally, resulting eventually in ownership, perhaps so can guilt. What is the condition of white life? We are moral debtors who act as material creditors. Our banks make bad loans. Our police, like Nietzsche’s creditors, act out their power on black bodies. And, as I see in my own language, we confuse whiteness with ownership. For most of us, the police aren’t ‘‘ours’’ any more than the banks are. When we buy into whiteness, we entertain the delusion that we’re business partners with power, not its minions. And we forget our debt to ourselves.

#### Acknowledging White Debt and taking responsibility for it prevents it from shaping subjectivities.

Sanderson 21 [Caroline, “Thomas Harding | 'We need to acknowledge and take responsibility for White Debt',” 10/08/21, <https://www.thebookseller.com/profile/thomas-harding-1282844>, JCR]

"We need to acknowledge and take responsibility for White Debt.” Over the past decade, Thomas Harding has written a series of enthralling narrative non-fiction books—including The House by the Lake, shortlisted for the Costa Biography Award, and Hans & Rudolf, which won the JQ-Wingate Prize for Non-Fiction—which employ aspects of his own family story to illuminate wider sweeps of modern history. In his latest book, White Debt: The Demerara Uprising and Britain’s Legacy of Slavery (W&N), he turns to historical events with which his family were only tangentially connected. But his riveting re-telling of the story of the slave revolt of 1823, in the former British colony of Demerara-Essequibo (now the South American nation of Guyana), enables him to confront the ways in which his own ancestors profited from the slave trade and, in the process, interrogate and challenge our received perspectives on slavery and colonialism. Harding felt compelled to write about slavery after researching Legacy, his most recent book, which charts how his maternal Jewish forebears escaped the pogroms of Eastern Europe and settled in Whitechapel in London’s East End. They established a small tobacco factory that quickly grew to become the largest catering company in the world: J Lyons. “I found myself wondering: ‘Where did the tobacco come from?’ And I discovered that it almost certainly came from North America, and from plantations worked by enslaved people,” Harding tells me via Zoom from his home in Hampshire. As he continued his investigations, Harding found himself shocked by how little he knew about British involvement in slavery. “I was profoundly embarrassed by my lack of knowledge. I spent 10 years living in the US, including in West Virginia, and if you had asked me what I knew about plantations, I’d have thought you were talking about the Deep South of the US, as depicted in ‘Gone With the Wind’ or ‘12 Years a Slave’. The plantations of the British Caribbean would never have occurred to me. And because I was brought up in Britain, I decided it was British slavery I needed to write about.” While looking for a way into the story that would place enslaved people at the centre of the narrative, Harding read the few existing memoirs of former slaves, and accounts of slave rebellions. “And then I came across the Demerara rebellion. I had no idea Demerara was even a place—I just thought it was a type of sugar”. It was across the sugar plantations of Demerara in 1823 that an uprising took place among the 77,000 people enslaved there. Starting on a plantation called Success, the rebellion quickly spread, before being brutally crushed by the British colonial militia. Harding tells the story from the viewpoints of four men: John Gladstone, father of four-time prime minister William Gladstone, a Liverpool merchant and one of Britain’s largest slaveowners, who was greatly enriched by the profits from several Demerara plantations, including Success; John Smith, a young British missionary sent to Demerara, who abhorred slavery; eyewitness to the uprising John Chieveley, a young white British man who hoped to better his prospects by taking a clerkship in a general store in Georgetown, the capital of Demerara; and at the centre of it all, Jack Gladstone, a slave from Success plantation (named for his owner) who led the uprising with his father Quamima. Harding shows how the Demerara insurrection led directly to the revival in Britain of the abolition debate which had lapsed after the 1807 act passed to abolish the trade in slaves, but not the right to own them. And he demonstrates how the courage of the enslaved Demerara freedom fighters became a key factor in the abolition of slavery across the British Empire, by helping finally to change public opinion when the appalling details of their treatment became widely known. The Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 heralded an end to plantation slavery in most British colonies, freeing more than 800,000 enslaved Africans, including those in Demerara-Essequibo. Harding’s wide-ranging research for White Debt was aided by the existence of valuable archives both in the UK and US, including the slave registers held in the National Archives in London, where he found the names of both Jack Gladstone and Quamima. “Seeing their names inscribed in these huge, red, leather-bound registers had an overwhelming emotional effect on me,” Harding says. He also drew on the court records of the trials that followed the uprising’s brutal suppression by the colonial militia, which enabled him to read the testimonies of those directly involved. “I was so fortunate to be able to do that because it’s incredibly rare to hear the voices of enslaved people.” Harding also managed to travel to Guyana via the US (he has an American passport) between the 2020 lockdowns, with the consent of the Guyanese government. There he walked the land formerly worked by slaves, and talked to local historians and to the descendants of enslaved people, finding the legacy of slavery “very much alive”. He points out that the present-day descendants of slaves do not have the privilege of delving in the archives to discover their family history, as he is able to do. “Where do I come from? Who were my great-grandparents? These questions are hard to answer if you’re from Guyana and of African heritage, because your lineage has been broken, your history is truncated. That has a profound impact, people there told me, on their confidence and their identity and their self-belief.” The historical chapters in White Debt are interspersed with such present-day reportage, along with Harding’s reflections as he begins to acknowledge the weight of his own family connections to slavery. Did he at any point question his right to tell the story of enslaved Africans? “I thought about it a lot and I felt a particular responsibility because of my own family story. I’ve tried my best to be respectful and sensitive and I’ve also tried to acknowledge the perspectives of other historians and researchers who have talked and written about the Demerara uprising. But ultimately I think it’s important for white people to write about slavery and acknowledge how much they have benefited, and continue to benefit from it.” While Harding is careful to avoid drawing inappropriate parallels between the treatment of those enslaved by the British to that of the Jews during the Holocaust, his intimate knowledge of his own family history has also given him some insights into intergenerational trauma, and empathy as to how the legacy of slavery might be experienced by the descendants of African slaves alive today. “There is no question that the trauma of Nazi Germany impacts me in a very real way; in terms of anxiety, fear, hyper-vigilance, of wanting to keep my head below the parapet and not causing a fuss. The Holocaust is more recent than the slave trade, but not much more so. Historically, it’s the same ballpark”. Yet while the Holocaust is a fixture on the National Curriculum in state schools, the history of British slavery is not. Why does he think some white British people are still so reluctant to engage in any meaningful way with the legacy of slavery? “I genuinely don’t understand what the fear is. To me the fact that history is fluid and ever evolving is both interesting and exciting, and we need to embrace that. And while the question of how we might repay our White Debt to the descendants of slaves and make reparations means having some difficult conversations, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be having them.”

### 1NC

#### Pessimistic politics saps the utopian energy of modernity, fueling neoliberal abandonment of progressive democratic politics. This affective demobilization results in passivity and resignation.

Karlsson 14 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “Theorizing sustainability in a post-Concorde world,” *Technology in Society* 39.1, http://bit.ly/2j6e614]

Certain in their belief that “ecological losses cannot be undone through the basic tenets of modernity” ([36]:245) as in the continuation of the rationalist-scientific enterprise, political ecologists seek to halt, and ultimately reverse, the structural processes of modernity. Running directly counter to prevailing socio-economic dynamics, it is not surprising that this effort has met with limited success. But by constantly emphasizing the ecological destructive tendencies of modernity while ignoring its long-term potential, political ecologists have been surprisingly successful in eroding our confidence in that science and technology can be used, in a conscious and radical manner, to ultimately overcome these destructive tendencies. By doubting our ability to consciously govern the future, political ecologists have drained the modern project of its utopian energies, effectively creating a passivity towards the future by which short-sighted market imperatives, rather than transparent democratic decisions and long-term public investments, become the determining factors. Instead of shiny fusion reactors and space travel, we are beginning to realize that the future may well be one of oil sands, offshore drilling, and increasingly destructive resource wars. Ironically, it may thus be that it is these feelings of passivity and doubt that ultimately will help create the very future that political ecologists fear. While few would dispute the more general claim that there has been a loss of confidence in our ability to democratically decide the long-term future ([75]; p. 6; [82]; p. 1), it would certainly be incorrect to attribute all of this loss to a relative small number of political ecologists, working on the margins of social discourse. But in their role as “truth tellers”, political ecologists have been able to tap into more general sentiments of estrangement that modernity has created. Capitalizing on the ontological insecurity arising from the acceleration of change in contemporary society, political ecologists have been able to project an alternative world of permanence and belonging. While such a world would also mean a foregoing of the existential freedom and mobility that modernity has given rise to [33], it is important to remember that for most people this is not about articulating a coherent social philosophy but about giving voice to a feeling of psychological bewilderment. In a similar fashion, while most people would, on reflection, acknowledge that humanity's lot has vastly improved over the last two hundred years, there are also legitimate concerns about the growth of conspicuous consumption, the emptiness of materialism, and the deep inequalities that persist, in particular at the global level. By articulating such concerns, political ecologists speak where others remain silent, an act which in itself has generated sufficient epistemic noise and doubt, not to reverse modernity, but to put sand in its machinery. Meanwhile, economic globalization has continued unchecked, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty (most notably in China) but also fuelling resentment as labour markets have become ever more stratified. Instead of seeing the possibilities in new global forms of welfare capitalism, the Left has found itself helplessly watching as an ever tighter straitjacket has been sewn around its political ambitions. For the Right, the same straitjacket has been viewed as a “golden straitjacket” ([31]:104) thought to ensure prudent macroeconomic policies, monetary stability, and protect against economic interventionism. Although recent events may have shattered some of those beliefs, these “ideas still walk among us” [70] to a surprisingly high degree, largely because the Left has been unable to formulate a coherent ideological alternative. Arguably, the most important legacy of the last decades of neoliberalism has been its attack on the idea of a self-directing democratic future. Neoliberals have been particularly opposed to the idea that society should make “grand” choices or pursue different “utopian” visions of the future. Instead, neoliberals believe that the state should at a maximum provide the “framework for utopia” [64] within which individuals can then pursue their own conceptions of the good. In relation to modernity, neoliberals have sought to convey the impression that all its grand tasks have either been completed or proven impossible; that redistribution has been attempted but failed since the poor are not poor because of structural reasons but because of lacking individual ambition, and that the road to the future goes through privatization and away from the public as an acting political subject. Contrary to the historic evidence of how public scientific research has driven long run growth in modern capitalism [55], neoliberals have argued that most public investments are “inherently wasteful” ([12]:153) and have forcefully hammered home the message that financial markets alone are able to make wise allocation choices and that markets can accurately reflect all relevant sources of social risk. Again, it is easy to think that these beliefs should have been thoroughly falsified by the recent financial meltdown which, if anything, has proven that markets are particularly bad at correctly estimating systemic risks. Yet, even in these extreme times, the Left has shown a remarkable lack of political imagination and remained trapped in nostalgic dreams of its own past glories. Unable to invigorate the utopian energies of modernity yet equally unwilling to commit to their reversal, contemporary society finds itself in a state of debilitating disorientation [44]. In the West, in particularly in the United States and Great Britain, rifts in the fabric of modernity are beginning to show. Bridges in perpetual disrepair, decrepit concrete motorway interchanges, and chronically delayed trains are all products of a politics of decline. While some of these effects may be caused simply by an early entry into industrialism, they also reflect a deeper political paralysis, one that has been made worse by ever harsher demands for public austerity. Despite record levels of private wealth, we increasingly find that we can no longer afford to invest in the future. While the reactionary worldview has found itself in ascendance, the Left, tied down by postmodern quibbles, has become fundamentally uncertain about what purposes its politics should serve. In the imagery of this article, we can now more clearly see what forces that are defining the post-Concorde world. On one hand, we have the political ecological critique of modernity which has revealed the terrible ecological price that human development has exerted yet obscured its emancipatory hopes and long-term potential. On the other hand, as the neoliberal rhetoric about the inherent wastefulness of public investments has taken hold, we find the very idea of the future as a site of democratic choice to be under attack by far more powerful forces. Taken together, these otherwise unrelated ideological currents have to a large extent succeeded in destabilizing the modern project and replacing it with a sense of resignation and pessimism about the future. Although we remain haunted by fears of far-future catastrophes (it is for instance commonly acknowledged that the most devastating effects of climate change will not be felt until the end of this century), such long time horizons are not at all employed when discussing what possibilities humanity may have as we are emerging as a planetary civilization. This mismatch between problems and solutions reflects a profound uncertainty about the desired direction of change, an uncertainty which, this article suggests, may in fact be our most serious cause for concern. If it is correct to say that the post-Concorde world is characterized by a deep-felt ambivalence towards modernity, then it becomes important to spell out the implications of this ambivalence in terms of our prospects for environmental sustainability.

#### The alternative is a progressive counter-narrative of globalization and democratic investment in universal prosperity. This is the only way to prevent intensification of xenophobic violence and climate nationalism.

Karlsson 16 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “The Environmental Risks of Incomplete Globalization,” *Globalizations*, http://bit.ly/2jS3RNS]

Every year, more and more people travel by airplane and are able to experience other countries and cultures first-hand. As the world gets smaller, it is becoming increasingly difficult to deny our common humanity and insist on the artificial segregation of people based on mere geographical luck. Yet, in terms of politics or ideology, there has been surprisingly little interest in even imagining a world with universal freedom of movement and shared prosperity. It is reasonable to think that this disinterest in part derives from deeply entrenched Malthusian beliefs and fears of a coming climate crisis. Malthusian discourse often portrays global climate change as ultimate evidence of irresponsibility, greed or even the “cancer stage of capitalism” (Barry, 2012:138). Such descriptions show little tolerance for learning or humility with regard to the difficulties of the task. There has never been a blueprint for how to build a prosperous planetary civilisation or for how to achieve technological maturity in a way that does not destroy the biosphere. Yet, in a world of seven billion actually existing people, the question is where to go from here? As discussed above, to try to reverse the great structural processes of modernity through intentional localisation does not only seem wholly politically unrealistic, it is also most unlikely to actually deliver greater resilience or environmental sustainability. Yet, the problem of lacking realism is just as acute for those advocating breakthrough innovation or seeking to more fully integrate the world (Karlsson, 2013). In a time of public austerity, rising xenophobia, and an almost complete absence of realistic yet transformative visions at the global level, it is not surprising that climate nationalist responses have emerged as the default policy orientation. While these responses may at best slow the rate of warming, they offer little hope for the 3.5 billion people who currently lack access to modern energy and, as such, they are likely to contribute to the creation of new patterns of climate injustice. They are also problematic in the sense that for every year that a more meaningful response is delayed, the need for CDR grows. Already now, such negative emissions technology has become more or less a necessity for achieving the two degree target according to the scenarios represented in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) database (Anderson, 2015). Whereas breakthrough energy innovation could potentially offer a source of sustained global growth as energy would become significantly cheaper, CDR is always going to come at a net cost. If CDR eventually becomes unaffordable due to prolonged political procrastination and generally inefficient mitigation policies, it is likely that the political momentum will shift towards solar radiation management (SRM) and other more risky forms of climate engineering. Instead of fearfully backing into a warming future, there is an obvious need for bold and proactive political action (Garibaldi, 2014; Karlsson, 2016). Yet, as long as mitigation is perceived as a cost and something that runs counter to broader socio-economic goals, such action is unlikely. While accelerating the transition to a high-energy planet would undoubtedly put strong upward pressure on global emissions in the short run, it would also open up a political opportunity space for effective climate action that does not exist today. In a more equal and integrated world, there would be greater financial and human resources to combat climate change. Most of all, by providing a progressive account of globalisation, there would be a meaningful counter-narrative to both nationalist and neoliberal thinking. For some time it has become obvious that the welfare state stands at a disruptive juncture. Either it can try to protect itself from the world by imposing an international apartheid system as it falters under growing migratory pressure, rising costs for retirement, and a self-inflicted energy crisis or it can confront those fears with a politics of radical engagement and accelerate the transition to a world of universal affluence with an abundance of clean energy and open borders. Doing so would require reviving the belief in the public as an active political subject and defeating both neoliberal passivity and the divisive identity politics of contemporary environmentalism. To bring back high growth rates in the mature economies would require a fundamental reconfiguration away from supply-side economics to real wage growth, broad social investments, and accelerated modernisation (rather than as today, artificially delayed urbanisation and subsidies for low-productive jobs in rural economies). Finally, by providing universal welfare services, in particular education but also health care, social trust can be strengthened and corruption reduced (Rothstein, 2011) at the same time as the economy’s long-term growth potential can be increased. Yet, despite the remarkable scientific advancements of the last centuries, or even decades, Malthusians tend to reject the very possibility of universal affluence and what they pejoratively refer to as a “techno-fix” (Huesemann & Huesemann, 2011). Instead of uncertain technological innovation they like to see deep social changes, essentially a far-reaching epistemological homogenisation by which people everywhere adopt strict regimes of frugality and simplicity. However, just as the solution to the contradictions of capitalism in the 1930’s was neither individual moral reform of the capital-owners nor a socialist revolution of society as a whole but rather the institutionalisation of welfare-capitalism and liberal democracy, it seems far wiser to accept the existence of a pluralist society with competing conceptions of the good life and rather focus on applying technology in a conscious way to overcome environmental determinism. Obviously, this is also a question of political tactics. While ecosocialist literature tends to think of capitalism in the 21st century as a mere elite project, it seems fair to say that the logic of capital accumulation has become almost universal today with widely shared material aspirations reaching from home ownership to international travel. Similarly, large groups in the OECD-economies either have retired already or will do so in the coming decades with considerable expectations in terms of retirement income. Failure to deliver on these pension expectations would probably create a state of political crisis in which the “immigrants” but also the “environment” would be easy targets. For these, and many other reasons, it is not surprising that political elites remain deeply wedded to the idea of economic growth. Yet, insufficient demand due to rising inequality and a lack of social investments have made it difficult to deliver that growth. In the best of worlds, the need for growth could hypothetically make policy-makers more willing to challenge the prevailing supply-side paradigm but also consider the benefits of accelerating globalisation (or at least keeping them away from enacting protectionist measures). While it is obvious that economic growth does not benefit everyone equally, and that it can be source of environmental destruction, the same can be said about the lack of growth. A secular stagnation or even degrowth is certainly no guarantee for environmental protection or greater equality. If anything, the rich are likely to try to isolate themselves even more from the rest of society in case they feel threatened, in particular by moving overseas. It is also not surprising that the literature on degrowth has had almost nothing to say about how such strategies would play out at the international level (including what mechanisms that would be needed to prevent other states from taking military advantage of countries pursuing degrowth) or how exactly economic growth is to be “unlearned” at the micro level. Recognising the difficulties associated with imagining degrowth as an effective way of saving the global environment is not the same as defending “status quo” or embracing neoliberalism. As discussed above, it is the rather the failure of laissez-faire thinking that has made government intervention necessary to ensure both climate stability and a world with more equal opportunities. One common objection against climate innovation is that the real problem is not about limitations of renewable energy sources but about overcoming the entrenched interests of fossil industries. Yet, the fact that large multinational corporations such as ExxonMobil have vast political influence can also be seen as one of the reasons why technological change must be disruptive and go beyond, for instance,the scenariosin the IPCC database. Only by shocking markets through breakthrough innovation does it seem possible to break with the path dependence of existing energy systems in a way that would rapidly displace fossil fuels globally. In terms of strategy, it is also likely that fossil industries will be far more successful in thwarting the deployment of existing inferior technologies than in preventing a more general acceleration of science and technology, which would span multiple fields reaching from nanotechnology to basic physics (Victor, 2011:144) that are not immediately related to energy R&D and as such not subject to the same political economic constraints. In mainstream thinking, globalisation is primarily seen as a driver of environmental destruction as it disconnects “those who make decisions that generate ecological risks” from “the ecological victims who suffer” (Christoff & Eckersley, 2013:189). While few would dispute that globalisation has indeed contributed to the displacement of environmental harms as polluting industries have moved from rich to poor countries, a number of authors including Arthur Mol have argued that globalisation also has the potential of fostering environmental reform and facilitating ecological modernisation throughout the global economy (Mol, 2003). The aim of this paper has been to take that argument further yet by suggesting that the hope of an adequate response to many global environmental risks, and climate change in particular, in fact hinges on an accelerated rate of globalisation leading to economic convergence. A more equal and richer world would not only have better resources to deal with environmental stress and the need for climate adaptation, it would also compel policy-makers to actively pursue the development of breakthrough technologies that would once and for all resolve the climate/energy/population dilemma from the supply-side (Brook et al., 2014:2). By working from the supply-side rather than the demand-side, climate politics can finally be depolarised and the current logical schism between “believers” and “sceptics” can be overcome. Yet, it would be naïve to think that all would welcome a radicalisation of the modern project and the transition to a fully integrated high-energy planet. While such a future would probably reflect widely shared public aspirations to freedom of movement, material security, and environmental protection, cultural perfectionists are likely to decry the blandness of diversity in a world of open borders, eco-socialists are likely to see any “techno-fix” as merely a way of ducking responsibility for what they consider to be necessary social reforms, and libertarians are likely to criticise the government “overreach” implicit in the very notion of taking active responsibility for the global future. Another common objection against breakthrough innovation is that time is too short for fundamentally uncertain research. Such an objection would make perfect sense if there was any faster or safer route to restoring a safe climate and protecting the world against broader Anthropocene risks. This paper has argued that there is no such route, at least as long as the interests of people outside the OECD-countries are to be taken seriously. While sustained poverty abroad may seem to temporarily reduce the urgency of action, it will also lead to further lock-in of existing yet inferior technologies and increase the long-term need for CDR/SRM. The fundamental problem here is the scale illusion by which signals of relative local progress towards perceived “sustainability” overshadow other signals of absolute global failure. Just as the example of Iceland that currently has a 100% renewable electricity supply has not taken the world as a whole any closer to fossil independence, little if anything would be achieved if a handful of the world’s richest countries succeed in their transition to a nonscalable soft energy path. Yet, unfortunately, renewable energy but also the idea of “energy savings” continue to occupy a moral high-ground in the public imagination in ways that make meaningful action extremely difficult and obscure how much energy supply, but also overall consumption rates, must increase in the coming decades to ensure that everyone in the world has a chance of achieving a dignified livelihood. Essentially, by turning the traditional environmental idea of “intentional localisation” on its head, this paper has suggested that what most of all will determine humanity’s future in the Anthropocene is to what extent it will be possible to craft a new progressive narrative of global economic convergence capable of simultaneously overcoming Malthusian determinism and neoliberal ignorance of environmental realities. As Bruno Latour has noted, humanity has to learn to “love its monsters” rather than running away in panic from science and technology out of fear for the world that it has created (Latour, 2011). Only through a more conscious and reflexive relationship to technology is there any hope for humanity to realise its axiological potential (Bostrom, 2003) while building a world in which emancipative values, pluralism, and diversity can flourish.

### 1NC

#### Neoliberalism is a discursive politics that relies on the work of the market metaphor. The AFF’s articulation of the social world in economic language re-constitutes all life as market, cementing the neoliberal dream and leading to the economization of life.

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### The economization of life has given rise to the Econocene---an unsustainable period of ecological collapse sustained by economism as the dominant secular religion. The Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

Richard B. Norgaard 19, Professor Emeritus of Ecological Economics in the Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley, “Economism and the Econocene: a coevolutionary Interpretation,” real-world economics review, issue no. 87, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue87/Norgaard87.pdf

The uniformity across geographies of fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies and the economies of scale of fossil hydrocarbon technologies selected for the corporate industrial order we know today. These direct changes, along with the coevolutionary processes of selection, freed people from coevolving with the complexities of the natural environment. This in turn gave rise to modern economism that pays no heed to nature. With our cosmos being the modern industrial order, economism emerged as the dominant secular religion, an eclectic package of beliefs that explain our place in the economic system, our relation to other people and nature, and how we should live what has been deemed a meaningful life.

Belief in markets spread, indeed was carried around the world, even forcefully so, to counter the rise of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, through efforts to “free” trade globally, and through the implementation of the idea of development. By the second half of the 20th century, much of the world was beginning to look like the market world assumed in economic models. In the late 20th century, the globalization of capital began and the interconnections between the patches of Figure 3 began to look more like Figure 6.

People performing specialized tasks are now so interdependent through markets that if people do not believe in markets and their larger purpose, all markets would collapse, as financial markets nearly have periodically, most recently in 2008. If markets collapse most of our population of 7.7 billion people would very quickly starve. Economism is necessary to sustain the economic cosmos in which people live.

Economism, however, has also become the dominant form of reasoning and the source of metaphors and utopias used in public communication. With the shrinkage of other ways of thinking about systems, economistic terminology has even become critical to how conservation biologists explain nature to the public. Nature, like other forms of wealth, can be thought of as capital that pays dividends in the form of ecosystem services. Saving nature has become a process of designing economic incentives for individual actors to invest in nature in order to reap her ecosystem services. In turn, conservation biologists now frame their research around market terminology to back up the ecosystem market programs they have helped facilitate. Biology is becoming economism.

The industrial order sustained by economism is not sustainable itself. We are in the Econocene maintained and coevolving with economism. Any new social organizational system that is sustainable, socially just, and provides meaningful lives will also need its “ism” to keep it going. This raises a key question. How can we have new system of beliefs/values, ways of thinking, and social organization emerge, a new ism, without crashing the current economic system, with economism maintaining it, on which we depend during the transition?

During the 20th century economistic beliefs have supported diverse and coevolving capitalisms as we know them and resulted in spectacular changes. Human population roughly quadrupled from about 1.6 billion people to 6.3 billion people. Global market economic activity during this period increased by nearly a factor of 40, or about 10-fold per capita. This rise of market activity entailed a parallel rise in specialization in work and associated knowledge. We went from a 19th century world in which the vast majority of people on the globe were pretty closely tied to the land and performing a similar mix of comparable agricultural and domestic activities to a 21st century world in which most people are performing specialized tasks using task specific knowledge. People are tied to bureaucratic structures, both public and private, while being globally interconnected by markets.8 This new system has proved extremely effective at producing material goods while also presenting unprecedented social and environmental challenges. It is this transformation into what I will call the Econocene that must be understood in order to find our way out.

While social organization, knowledge, and values were coevolving around fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies, however, the geosphere and biosphere systems were operating on a different time scale, accumulating the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that are now resulting in climate change, sea level rise, and a further quickening of the extinction of species.

The Econocene is a period of rapid transition of the geosphere and collapse of the biosphere. The transition to sustainability, social justice, and meaningful lives will not occur simply through the use of market mechanism to reduce carbon in the atmosphere. The economy has become our cosmos. We awake to stock market reports from financial capitals several time zones to our East, work in command and control hierarchical corporate structures while praising free markets, and are absolutely dependent on others in distant places working for the global economic machine. City lights and polluted air curtain us from the starry heavens, few are even aware of the phase of the moon. Reality is on the screens at our desks and on our cell phones in our hands, we share hearts through social media rather than in person. To face the reality we are in, our consciousness needs to become much more closely aligned with how nature and people function in a rapidly changing interaction. The economism that drives and coevolves with the Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

#### The alternative is to become critically aware of the generative force of metaphor. We can accept the 1AC, but must reject their marketized language.

Michael Augustín 15, postgraduate student of PhD. program at Department of Political Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, “The Market Metaphor As an Issue of Political Language and Practice,” Czech Journal of Political Science, March 2015.

2. Defining Approach

A metaphor is a figure of speech that is often employed in political theory and political practice. It is not peculiar to politics as a social science, though: metaphors may guide our understanding of complex, difficult relationships in any domain. But they may also mislead. Because of this, examining their impact takes on urgency, and this is what we do in the text that follows. The Czech political scientist Petr Drulák speaks of metaphor in politics in terms of discursive structures, i.e., customary rules that impact the discourse itself (Drulák 2009: 59). Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By suggest that metaphor is more than simply a speech act or poetic ornament. Rather than being a purely linguistic phenomenon, it pertains directly to our thoughts and actions: how we think and behave is largely influenced by metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3–4). An example they cite, ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ is a perfect example, and confirms that the way we perceive a particular activity impacts how we perform it.

The use of metaphor is thus in no way neutral. Metaphor has a determining influence over our understanding of particular situations. It frames the subject and decides how we think about a topic area. Individual metaphors organize our thoughts and actions and become a substitute for thought and analysis, but often gain uncritical acceptance and harbour certain perils (Patterson 1998: 221). They function to suppress certain aspects of a situation and emphasize others, thus shaping meaning in a way that justifies particular actions or sanctions particular acts, or simply aids in choosing goals (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 142).

Terrell Carver and Jernej Pikalo confirm that metaphors such as ‘branches of government’ and ‘head of state’ used in describing political situations and processes influence our political perceptions (Carver, Pikalo 2008: 1). Jonathan Charteris-Black develops the argument that in political contexts, metaphor is used for ideological purposes because it activates unconscious emotional associations; metaphors change how we understand and think about politics by influencing our feelings (Charteris-Black 2011: 32) and thereby contribute to myth creation (Charteris-Black 2011: 28). Metaphor is typically used in persuasion and frequently employed in the language of rhetoric and argumentation, such as in political speeches (Charteris-Black 2004: 7). But its use does not end there. It has proven an impressive tool for academic research. But it may happen that the researcher becomes so entranced by the clarity and simplicity of argumentation that metaphor offers that he or she overlooks deeper connections in the phenomenon under study.

Before we examine the central issue in this study, we must first differentiate between the concepts of analogy and metaphor as used in this paper. By ‘analogy’ we shall intend a perceived similarity between two entities. The ‘metaphor’ is a higher-level mapping of these similarities that is used to communicate them in the form of a figure of speech. In the current context, the logic is as follows: if in political discourse we speak of politics as a market, we have created a metaphor based on the similarity of properties. If instead we observe that politics involves a competition for voters just as the market mechanism embodies a competition for customers, or that catallactic (i.e. exchange) patterns obtain in politics as they do in the economic market, we have spelled out a concrete similarity and in so doing have pointed out an analogy. Thus, we are analyzing specific similarities between the marketplace and the political system, which we may term analogies, that are subsumed under the market metaphor.

The metaphor may be imagined simply as a set and the analogies it implies as a subset of that metaphor. In a typical deduction, the premises taken together may be said to form a set. Syllogistic reasoning is applied using this set of two or more propositions asserted or assumed to be true to arrive at a conclusion. We may consider an analogy to be a premise (‘politics is an exchange’, ‘politics is a competition’). The metaphor is then the argument, and is more complex (‘politics functions as an economic market’). Metaphors always implicitly contain a set of analogies that state some A is like B. A set of such analogies therefore creates the metaphor A is B. We know of no other scholar who works with metaphor and analogy in this particular formulation, but we consider the distinction between analogy and metaphor to be justified.

The approach to metaphor and analogy presented here is complementary to that given in Donald Schön’s Generative Metaphor: a Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy. The operation of the economic metaphor in politics shares common ground with Schön’s generative metaphors. His topic is social policy, and he notes that social policy has more to do with how we frame the objective to be achieved than it does with the selection of the optimal means to achieve it (Schön 1993: 138). ‘Such a multiplicity of conflicting stories about the situation makes it dramatically apparent that we are dealing not with ‘reality’, but with various ways of making sense of reality’ (Schön 1993: 149). Inadequate metaphors inevitably give rise to insidiously inadequate solutions, because some are based on an inappropriate or simplistic understanding of the situation.

Generative metaphor is generative in the sense that it generates new perceptions and explanations, and invents reality. So not all metaphors are generative (Schön 1993: 142). But the market metaphor in politics does generate new perceptions and provide new insight into the political process. It is obvious that Schön is aware of the inherent risk that generative metaphors bear, and he calls for critical analysis to uncover their non-analogical connections: ‘The notion of generative metaphor then becomes an interpretive tool for the critical analysis of social policy. My point here is not that we ought to think metaphorically about social policy problems, but that we ought to become critically aware of these generative metaphors, to increase the rigor and precision of our analysis of social policy problems by examining the analogies and ‘disanalogies’ between the familiar descriptions’ (Schön 1993: 138–139)

## Case

### 1NC – Adversarialism Turn

#### The adversarial structure of debate turns aff solvency

Atchison and Panetta ‘9 [Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34 //liam]

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus **encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem**. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.¶ If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.¶ From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

### 1NC - Academy

#### Positioning within the structure of debate and the academy subverts the radical intentions of the Aff – their resistance becomes an object of surveillance and consumption.

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

### 1NC- Turn

#### Well-regulated capitalism is possible, sustainable, and solves every existential threat – alternatives sacrifice millions to irreversible poverty

Budolfson 21 (Mark Budolfson, Assistant Professor in the Department of Environmental and Occupational Health and Justice at the Rutgers School for Public Health and Center for Population–Level Bioethics., 5-7-2021, Arguments for Well-Regulated Capitalism, and Implications for Global Ethics, Food, Environment, Climate Change, and Beyond, Cambridge Core, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/arguments-for-wellregulated-capitalism-and-implications-for-global-ethics-food-environment-climate-change-and-beyond/96F422D04E171EECDEF77312266AE9DD>) MAM

The Argument for Well-Regulated Capitalism

However, things are more complicated than the arguments above would suggest, and the benefits of capitalism, especially for the world's poorest and most vulnerable people, are in fact myriad and significant. In addition, as we will see in this section, many experts argue that **capitalism is not the fundamental cause** of the previously described problems but rather **an essential component of the best solutions** to them and of the best methods for promoting our goals of health, well-being, and justice.

To see where the defenders of capitalism are coming from, consider an analogy involving a response to a pandemic: if a country administered a rushed and untested vaccine to its population that ended up killing people, we would not say that vaccines were the problem. Instead, the problem would be the flawed and sloppy policies of vaccine implementation. Vaccines might easily remain absolutely essential to the correct response to such a pandemic and could also be essential to promoting health and flourishing, more generally.

The argument is similar with capitalism according to the leading mainstream arguments in favor of it: Capitalism is an essential part of the best society we could have, just like vaccines are an essential part of the best response to a pandemic such as COVID-19. But of course both capitalism and vaccines can be implemented poorly, and can even do harm, especially when combined with other incorrect policy decisions. But **that does not mean** that **we** should **turn against them**—quite the opposite. **Instead, we should embrace them as essential** to the best and most just outcomes for society, and educate ourselves and others on their importance and on how they must be properly designed and implemented with other policies in order to best help us all. In fact, the argument in favor of capitalism is even more dramatic because it claims that much more is at stake than even what is at stake in response to a global pandemic—what is at stake with capitalism is nothing less than whether the world's poorest and most vulnerable billion people **will remain in conditions of poverty and oppression, or** if they will instead finally **gain access to** what is minimally necessary for **basic health and wellbeing** and become increasingly affluent and empowered. The argument in favor of capitalism proceeds as follows:

Premise 1. Development and the past. Over the course of recorded human history, the majority of historical **increases in health, wellbeing, and justice have occurred** in the last two centuries, largely **as a result of societies adopting** or moving toward **capitalism**. Capitalism is a relevant cause of these improvements, in the sense that they could not have happened to such a degree if it were not for capitalism and would not have happened to the same degree **under any alternative** noncapitalist approach to structuring society. The argument in support of this premise relies on observed relationships across societies and centuries between indicators of degree of capitalism, wealth, investments in public goods, and outcomes for health, wellbeing, and justice, together with econometric analysis in support of the conclusion that the best explanation of these correlations and the underlying mechanism is that large increases in health, wellbeing, and justice are largely driven by increasing investments in public goods. The scale of increased wealth necessary to maximize these investments requires capitalism. Thus, as capitalist societies have become dramatically wealthier over the past hundred years (and wealthier than societies with alternative systems), this has allowed larger investments in public goods, which simply has not been possible in a sustained way in societies without the greater wealth that capitalism makes possible. Important investments in public goods include investments in basic medical knowledge, in health and nutrition programs, and in the institutional capacity and know-how to regulate society and capitalism itself. As a result, capitalism is a primary driver of positive outcomes in health and wellbeing (such as increased life expectancy, lowered child and maternal mortality, adequate calories per day, minimized infectious disease rates, a lower percentage and number of people in poverty, and more reported happiness);5 and in justice (such as reduced deaths from war and homicide; higher rankings in human rights indices; the reduced prevalence of racist, sexist, homophobic opinions in surveys; and higher literacy rates).6 These quantifiable positive consequences of global capitalism **dramatically outweigh the negative consequences** (such as deaths from pollution in the course of development), with the result that the net benefits from capitalism in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice have been greater than they would have been under any known noncapitalist approach to structuring society.7

Premise 2. Economics, ethics, and policy. Although capitalism has often been ill-regulated and therefore failed to maximize net benefits for health, wellbeing, and justice, it **can become well-regulated** so that it maximizes these societal goals, by including mechanisms identified by economists and other policy experts that do the following:

**optimally regulate negative effects such as pollution and monopoly power**, and invest in public goods such as education, basic healthcare, and fundamental research including biomedical knowledge (more generally, policies that correct the failures of free markets that economists have long recognized will arise from “externalities” in the absence of regulation);9

ensure equity and distributive justice (for example, via wealth redistribution);10

ensure basic rights, justice, and the rule of law independent of the market (for example, by an independent judiciary, bill of rights, property rights, and redistribution and other legislation to correct historical injustices due to colonialism, racism, and correct current and historical distortions that have prevented markets from being fair);11 and

ensure that there is no alternative way of structuring society that is more efficient or better promotes the equity, justice, and fairness goals outlined above (by allowing free exchange given the regulations mentioned).12

To summarize the implication of the first two premises, well-regulated capitalism is essential to best achieving our ethical goals—which is true even though capitalism has certainly not always been well regulated historically. **Society can still do much better** and remove the large deficits in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice that exist under the current inferior and imperfect versions of capitalism.

#### Preserving competition and innovation within the market economy creates solutions to climate change.

Bosch and Schmidt 19 (Stephan, Institute of Geography, Chair for Human Geography, University of Augsburg, and Matthias, Institute of Geography, Chair for Human Geography, University of Augsburg, “Is the post-fossil era necessarily post-capitalistic? – The robustness and capabilities of green capitalism”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 161, July) DB

Concerning the second dimension of criticism, Section 4 illustrates how the rejection of green capitalism overlooks promising approaches to surmounting the environmental crisis. On the one hand, we argue that in face of the given narrow time slot as well as the prevailing political strategies, it is more realistic and pragmatic to primarily assess the efficiency of market-oriented solutions. Even though in principle we take sufficiency to have the best effectiveness regarding the solution of ecological and social problems, we still do not count on people's willingness to live in greater moderation within due time. On the other hand, we therefore presume that there are no other suitable economic frame conditions for surmounting the crisis than those offered by the capitalist social order. This perspective is based on the assumption that innovations, which above all emanate from thriving economies (Wangler, 2013), are highly relevant for overcoming the environmental crisis. As growth, innovation, and the development of new industries are to be seen as directly related to the export sector as well as the utilisation of comparative advantages (Bathelt and Glückler, 2012), we therefore also strictly object to the concept of autonomy. Moreover, we take innovation and the aspects of growth, entrepreneurship, and democratic processes of negotiation related to it (cf. Gailing et al., 2013; Walter and Gutscher, 2013; Raven et al., 2016), to be essential for the implementation of regenerative energy systems and social welfare (Iversen, 2005; Nasirov et al., 2017). Our presumption that innovations occur more likely and more frequently within a capitalist, than in alternative social orders (e.g. Harris, 2013: socialist markets), is derived from Schumpeter's notion of competitive capitalism, which he distinctly sets apart from trustified capitalism. Competitive capitalism is about fertile destructive impulses emanating from enthusiastic entrepreneurs who are ready to take risks, and act solution-oriented. These impulses may revolutionise the economic process: “This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism” (Schumpeter, 2009). Based on Schumpeter's ‘theory of economic development’ (cf. Herzog and Honneth, 2016; Schumpeter, 1994; Schumpeter, 2009) – which, according to Marques (2008), represents the original idea of innovation-driven capitalism – we analyse capitalism's robustness to the downfall of fossil energy; moreover, we investigate its potential contributions to ecologic sustainability. Yet we want to go beyond Schumpeter's perspective, which fixes on the entrepreneur, and take a closer look at the role of state policy in Section 5. Our argument is that creative entrepreneurs and markets alone will not suffice to specifically and quickly initiate the change of the energy system driven by innovation. We state the thesis that an active role of the state is needed which relies on political continuity when it comes to promoting environmental innovation and creates stable institutional frame conditions. In a last step, we will show that during the deployment of regenerative energy systems, social aspects have hitherto been given too little attention by actors of state and politics and that national objectives were uncoupled from local contexts. To achieve a successful low-carbon transition, these deficits need to be corrected. In principle, this seems possible, as market-economically oriented regenerative energy systems have often been the result of open-minded democratic negotiations. In Section 6, the findings of the study will be summarised. 2. The crisis of fossil energies and capitalism Energy sources are a central element of humankind's materialistic history and elementary changes in the relevance of energy carriers have always led to extensive economic and societal transformations (Bridge et al., 2013). Exemplarily, the drastic increase in productivity during industrialisation cannot be explained without the revolutionary change of the energy system towards fossil fuels (Osterhammel, 2011). Ever since, economic growth is accompanied by an increasing consumption of finite energy resources and non-energetic primary materials (Altvater, 2005). Accordingly, questions of economic development must always be regarded in the context of the energy system, as well as the circulation of energetic and non-energetic crude materials within it (Meadows et al., 2004). Altvater (2007) takes the relationship between humans and nature to be crisis-laden because a limited stock of energy resources within the Earth's thin crust forms the basis of the present economic system. This limitation implied grave consequences for the global ecology. The apparently crisis-laden interrelation of nature and economy is also highlighted in ‘Anthropocene or Capitolocene?’ edited by Moore (2016), in which the impacts of capitalism are regarded as significant enough to be marked as their own geochronological era. The main point of criticism is capitalism's orientation to industrial scaling and quantitative growth (Mathews, 2011), which likely will end abruptly once Earth's limited capacities will have been depleted by the exponential growth of population and economy (Daly, 1995). Yet not only the finiteness of energy carriers, but also the accumulation of extreme meteorological incidents, mass mortality of species, and sea level rise represent impediments of stable economic growth (McCarthy, 2015). The scenarios concerning trends of the world's condition developed by the Club of Rome illustrate that keeping a high wealth level can only be accomplished if a radical change in societal attitude concerning the valuation of growth will take effect (Meadows et al., 2004). Stopping environmental destruction while maintaining the present economic system appears to be impossible, since fossil energy carriers provide globally acting companies with the opportunity to spatially separate production and consumption as well as to externalise the manifold ecological expenses (Chisholm, 1990). Bridge (2010) rates the heated debates about Peak Oil as ecologically motivated forebodings of a new energy order in which the modern industrial nations are going to free themselves of their dependence on oil. For Neomarxist groups, the end of the age of mineral oil even represents an apocalyptic turn of eras during which nature were going to take vengeance on the ecological arrogance of capitalism. According to Bettini and Karaliotas (2013), the narration of Peak Oil thereby attains a symbolism that reaches far beyond mathematical calculations of the scarcity of fossil energy sources, being extended to a general criticism of a system that is exclusively oriented on growth. McCarthy (2015) sees the chance of a post-fossil capitalism especially in the commodification of wind, sunlight, geothermal heat, and waves. This way, nature would again be introduced into the cycle of capital. Van den Bergh (2011) presumes that this may be a practicable approach, perceiving criticism of market economy and capitalism as too radical and warns of one-sidedly problematising growth without simultaneously pointing out realisable alternative ways. He therefore prefers the ‘a-growth-concept’, which assumes a neutral position on growth, trying to create social as well as ecological sustainability by means of pricing policy, environmental agreements, and education initiatives. The commodification of nature, however, is rejected by the degrowth movement, as the comparison of the Montreal Protocol, which is based on regulations (ozone) with the Kyoto Protocol based on trade had shown a greater effectiveness of regulative measures (Kallis, 2011). Concerning the market's capabilities, North (2010) additionally speaks of the neoliberal enthusiasts' mindless faith in technology, who were mistakenly convinced that creative destruction is sufficient to face the societal challenges posed by Peak Oil and the climate crisis. Sarkar and Kern (2008) limit the possibilities of the global community's further development to the two options ‘eco socialism’ or ‘barbarism’. This rhetoric stylises capitalism as the image of the enemy: on the one hand, it represents the cause of the global ecological crisis due to the exploitation of natural resources – and for that reason alone were not to be maintained (Daly, 2005) – while on the other hand not offering a suitable social framework for mastering the crisis (Kallis et al., 2009). Hence, the development of a symbiotic economy (Garcia-Olivares and Sole, 2015) rooted beyond obsessive economic growth (Buch-Hansen, 2018) is promoted. Renewable energies were apt to meet these requirements since they can be developed through collaborative bottom-up mechanisms on a communal level, therefore enabling the decentralisation and democratisation of energy supply (Rifkin, 2013). In fact, this may be an option. However, in the following, we want to demonstrate that capitalism is not only very robust to crises, but is also able to contribute to the solution of the environmental crisis. 3. Robustness of capitalism 3.1. Space-time compression We will now show that the possibility of increasing productivity does not end with the transition to a regenerative energy system, but only needs to be embedded into new logistic-infrastructural contexts. In this, we contradict Altvater (2007), Huber (2009) and North (2010), who claim that capitalism could expand only on the basis of fossil fuels, since, due to the global transportability of oil, gas, and coal, entrepreneurial actions are no longer bound to the local availability of energy resources, but range globally. Furthermore, the usage of fossil energy carriers is not subject to daily or seasonal fluctuations. Transportability and baseload capacity hence lead to space-time compression (Harvey, 1996), as products can be generated in ever shorter intervals of time. Following this logic, the limitation of the fossil resource basis inevitably brings about the end of the capitalistic system. It remains undisputed that energy flow within a solar-based energy system is hard to control (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). Most forms of renewable energies are intermittent sources, whose contribution to the energy mix are subject to the rhythms of sun, wind, precipitation, and tides (Fares, 2015). Adapting energy production to demand, a fundamental prerequisite of continuous economic growth, thus becomes a major challenge. What Altvater (2007), Huber (2009) and North (2010) actually do not include in their considerations, are the numerous technological innovations for the stabilisation of regenerative energy systems. After all, with biomass and geothermal power, two energy carriers capable of providing base load are at hand (Matek and Gawell, 2015), which may, in the form of regenerative combined power plants, support the weather-dependent energy sources sun and wind (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011; Ramchurn et al., 2011). The numerous energy storage technologies are also important, albeit only few of these have reached industrial maturity. In principle, mechanical, chemical, electrical, or thermal kinds of storage are being discerned (Hadjipaschalis et al., 2009). Compressed air and pumped storage power plants with efficiency levels of up to 80% are especially promising (Anagnostopoulos and Papantonis, 2008). Research is also conducted on the conversion of surplus regenerative power into methane or hydrogen (Jensen et al., 2007), by which the bidirectional operation of the power and gas network is made possible, allowing for transportability as well as baseload capacity within large spatial units. Space-time availability may also be augmented by the development and capacity expansion of high-voltage transmission lines (Walter and Bosch, 2013). Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) have pointed out at an early point, that the existent grids, having been developed following a monopolistic logic, are outdated and incapable of integrating decentrally-produced electricity with strong fluctuations. These deficits, however, are successively being corrected. E.g., Germany's South, which is poor in wind but strong in terms of industry is being provided with direct access to the big wind energy off-shore potentials in the North as well as to the storage power plants in Scandinavia (cf. Fig. 1). The possibilities of intercontinental power transport from regenerative sources have been thoroughly investigated by DLR (2006) and Grossmann et al. (2014). Both energy storage and the development of the power grid thus will successively reverse the present space-time limitations of regenerative energy systems. The two domains, however, are not isolated from one another, but are coordinated via smart grids. Solomon and Krishna (2011) emphasise that smart grids are superbly suitable for the implementation of market-based approaches, so that an innovation-driven mass market for energy efficiency technologies could be anticipated. Smart grids also provide the possibility of no longer designing the mass production of renewable energy technologies on a fossil basis, but by the usage of renewable energy. While the production of the first generation of regenerative technologies was based on fossil energy, in future, the possibilities of energy storage, the almost unlimited energy potential of a solar-based economy, and the combination of both aspects through smart grids will ensure the flexible provision of regenerative energy at every production site without limits of time. Yet in order to optimise the flows of energy and material in smart grids, concepts of closed crude material cycles are needed, which, in the sense of the cradle-to-cradle approach (cf. Section 4), allow the reintroduction of used materials (e.g. old wind power plants made of renewable resources) to the biosphere. Thus, the problem of externalisation of ecological costs can be minimised. Summing up, the increase of productivity and stable economic growth within regenerative energy systems seems possible. Still, it remains to be emphasised that large-scale energy projects also entail negative social consequences. E.g., Yenneti et al. (2016) have shown that the Charanka solar park in Gujarat, India, was erected on areas that the local population's livelihood had depended on for decades. The refuse of access to these areas, as well as the inhabitants' successive dispossession through state measures thus are direct results of the Indian economy's ecological modernisation (Levien, 2013). In this context, Baka (2013) speaks of “energy dispossessions”, a phenomenon which has also been observed with large-scale wind energy parks (Avila, 2018; Cowell, 2010). The socio-material impact of economic modernisation on the local population, whose lives strongly depend on agricultural land use, are often insufficiently respected (Yenneti et al., 2016), so that the dubious impression was given that environmental protection and economic growth based on efficient technologies, competition, and state measures could go with one another without social side effects. Remarkably, the controversial energy mega-projects especially in the global South, are not the cause of the development of new power asymmetries and conflicts, but rather reproduce and harden long-standing social disparities and injustices (Avila, 2018). According to Bradley and Hedrén (2014), a low-carbon transition hence misses its aims if it is only about modernising the energy system without likewise transforming the underlying social structures. 3.2. Crisis as an element of capitalist social order We hold the view that the occurrence of crises in capitalism is not due to it being an ailing, doomed economic order; nor is it a proof of capitalism's ineptitude for meeting ecological challenges. Instead, we deem that crisis is a fundamental element of the capitalist social order that actually provides a chance for readjusting economic processes. Harvey (2011) explains that anything blocking the circulation and accumulation of capital may pose a threat to the capitalist system and induce a fundamental crisis. The finiteness of fossil fuels is a crisis of this kind (McCarthy, 2015). Altvater (2007) is convinced that capitalism will not be able to overcome this crisis; therefore, future technologic progress had to be embedded in a non-fossil, non-capitalist framework. Kallis (2011) also emphasises that the approach to a steady state (cf. Daly, 1991, Daly, 2005) will transform the institutional preconditions of property, work, banking, and distribution to such an extent that in the end, it will be impossible to still identify them as capitalistic. With regard to Kallis' doubts concerning the institutional robustness of capitalism, Schumpeter points out that precisely the ups and downs of industrial development, which are the outcomes of successful innovations' intensifying competition, enable progress (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). As crises therefore represent an immanent part of the capitalist system, an environmental and resources-related crisis caused by the capitalistic process does not provide sufficient evidence to suggest a possible downfall of the capitalistic social order. The crisis might even be taken as proof of an economic cycle, if it is regarded as a period of depression between the dwindling fossil and the emerging regenerative age. Böhm et al. (2012) and McCarthy (2015) confirm that capitalism is capable of overcoming even fundamental crises, actually using these as starting points of its further expansion. Concerning the environmental crisis, Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) also concede that the deployment of renewable energies holds the potential of founding a new form of capitalism that is characterised by a much lower degree of materialistic lavishness. Bettini and Karaliotas (2013) emphasise that from a neo-liberal point of view, the accusation of capitalism bringing about a resources-related and environmental crisis does not at all provoke self-doubts. Rather, it caused the profitable marketing of adequate approaches to solutions in the field of resource depletion and environmental impacts to move into economic focus. Even Altvater (2007) points out that the externalised effects of production and consumption on nature become relevant for companies once they jeopardise profitability and accumulation. In that case, environmental problems and their solutions can actually be made part of capitalist logic. Solomon and Krishna (2011) are convinced that in order to solve the environmental crisis, it were not even necessary to achieve further technologic breakthroughs, as the technologies needed for the remodeling of society towards energy efficiency were already mature and cost-efficient. Even if capitalism might be sufficiently robust, Kallis (2011) still takes the crisis as a chance to break up obstructive social and political lock-ins that have hitherto seemed unalterable and have lead into the crisis. Yet he does not regard the ability of social and political transformation to be inherent in the traits of market, but as a characteristic of a social order orientated towards degrowth. Certainly, Kallis is right in saying that the market is hard to control, making a concerted transformation towards sustainability difficult. Still his criticism only refers to that form of capitalism which Schumpeter characterised as trustified capitalism and which does lead to ecologically problematic lock-in effects. The criticism cannot, however, be applied to competitive capitalism, which generates those basic innovations giving rise to the revolutionary crises described as so fertile by Kallis (2011). Thus, an opportunity is provided for alternative social conditions to be brought about – but within the capitalist social order – and for substantiating these new conditions through further innovations. Innovations may emerge outside of competition and market economy, but will then lack the required frequency and force, as growth represents the most important incentive of innovation (Wangler, 2013). On the other hand, a continuous process of innovation again leads to growth, which may revolutionise the present social conditions, as Schumpeter states (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Thereby, a new combination of the given means of production within new sites of production emerges, generating new goods, methods, and markets. Productive resources are applied to hitherto untested usages while being withdrawn from those usages they served before (Geels, 2011). What Kallis (2011) terms technological optimism with regard to the ecological innovative power of capitalism, is therefore technological realism in the context of Schumpeter's competitive capitalism. Without doubt, innovative boosts on the part of already established companies are also conceivable and may give rise to the possibility of maintaining trustified capitalism with its ecologically precarious structures. An example hereof is the innovation ‘Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage’, by which the ecological impact of the emission intensive electrical conversion of coal is being reduced (Benson and Orr, 2008). Technological progress may hence stabilise the existent system of economy and policy that is accountable for the environmental crisis (Bettini and Karaliotas, 2013). In Schumpeter's view, however, the decisive economic order is competitive capitalism, which is characterised by the aggressive economic demeanour of new, innovative enterprises economically challenging the establishment (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). The start-ups of new companies, which are inseparably connected with the processes of innovation, withdraw production goods from the present capitalist system by underbidding, disturbing the former economic balance that is so destructive for nature. Competition is therefore essential for overcoming the environmental crisis. In that respect, the concept of ‘solidary economics’ and its precept of surmounting the allegedly ruthless principle of competition and emancipating oneself from the logic of the markets (Embshoff and Giegold, 2008), is counterproductive, as the renunciation of competition impedes the breakup of crusted economic structures, which thus continue to harm the environment. After all, the big energy providers' strategy was and is to hold on to the fossil-nuclear power plant pool for as long as possible, suppressing alternative concepts of energy supply (Gawel et al., 2012). A radical transformation of the energy system therefore cannot emerge from the existent structures, as Schumpeter assesses (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Instead, innovative processes emerge outside of the old major companies until proceeding to attack the incumbent regime through the rededication of means of production (Geels, 2011). Innovative marketing strategies of small and middle scale businesses supplanting cumbersome large companies play an essential part especially in the field of renewable energies (Walsh, 2012). In this, competition is a decisive element that cannot easily be superseded. 4. Capabilities of green capitalism A competitive green capitalism develops great creativity by its high rate of innovation, which may also reinvent the relationship between humans and nature. We now want to exemplify how this might be brought about. Schumpeter holds the view that innovation is the result of the capitalistic entrepreneurial spirit, not the other way round (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Technological and social progress hence are no independent variables materialising out of thin air, but arise from the logic of the capitalist process. Meadows et al. (2004) accept that innovations may relocate the limits of growth, making it possible to maintain the living standard by continuously reducing the consumption of crude materials and energy. However, one of the energy system's prevailing deficits is that depleted or not yet tapped resources are being (re-)obtained based on non-regenerative energy (Schwartzman, 2008), causing capitalistic production to be increasingly energetically inefficient (Murphy and Hall, 2011). Overcoming the energy crisis hence calls for the consideration of thermodynamic principles (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, Georgescu-Roegen, 1986; Martinez-Alier, 1987). Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) see the deployment of renewable energies as a possibility of limiting the creation of entropy. Kaberger and Mansson (2001) have shown that innovative resources-saving material cycles may be possible and economical if they are based on the usage of the inexhaustible energy of irradiance. What is promising about this approach is that, due to research and development, the utilisation of solar energy becomes more and more efficient and lucrative (Schmid, 2016). Moreover, its inexhaustible potential allows for the exploitation of material resources even from deposits with extremely low crude material density. On a local level, the utilisation of solar energy may actually lead to a reduction of entropy (Ebeling et al., 1998; Kranert and Cord-Landwehr, 2010), as it is the case with the usage of waste heat of solar thermal power plants for the desalination of sea water (DLR, 2007). The integration of these capacities into smart grids and the associated remodeling of every production process to purely regenerative sources have been detailed in Section 3. We further argue that innovation surpasses conceivability. Even Harris (2010) sees a particularly high potential in unpredictable technological innovations to break through economic routine, thus encouraging further entrepreneurs in issuing their own innovations. Capitalism might thereby be provided with the chance to reduce its ecological exploitation. But innovation exceeds strictly technological aspects and may as well comprise social and institutional aspects (Arentsen and Bellekom, 2014). E.g., in the mobility sector, whose pollutant emissions have significantly contributed to the environmental crisis, innovations have led to new features of cargo and passenger transportation. This is illustrated by the example of car sharing as an innovative life style (Prettenthaler and Steininger, 1999) or bicycle-sharing schemes in urban areas (Midgley, 2011). Another representative case is the history of the ozone hole, which Meadows et al. (2004) describe as a history of civil success regarding the correction of a severe overshoot. Quite in the sense of Schumpeter, Meadows et al. (2004) name the ‘industry's creative heads’ as the crucial problem-solving determinant. Through the three innovative boosts ‘better insulation’, ‘reduced toxic substitute materials’, and ‘emission-free alternative substances’, it will be possible to rebuild the original density of the ozone layer by the mid-21st century. Remarkably, this is realised without abandoning the existent economic system. Furthermore, we argue that it is realistic to assume growth-oriented, competitive markets in the future, rather than socio-material conditions beyond them, which, as stated by Van den Bergh (2011) are completely uncertain as of now (e.g. Harris, 2013: socialist markets). We therefore hold the view that it is more pragmatic to design future mass markets in an eco-friendly way. Kallis (2011) rejects the possibility that the wonder of a dematerialised economy might occur, as improvements of efficiency were overcompensated by growing consumption. While dematerialisation may be tantamount to a wonder, researchers still do put effort into adjusting the materialised economy to ecological compatibility. One aspect is the thorough redefinition of nature protection, because nowadays, nature protection is reduced to the attempt of limiting the harmfulness of processes and products (Mulhall and Braungart, 2010). However, due to the potential creation of new mass markets for more eco-friendly and efficient processes or products, this strategy holds the danger of actually augmenting unwanted effects through rebound effects. In this regard, Alcott (2005) points to the Jevon's Paradox which says it is a great error to think that technologic innovations were going to reduce the consumption of resources. Polimeni et al. (2015) name the example of the Green Revolution: the remarkable increase of food production's area efficiency was not at all able to abate the problems of hunger and area consumption, as consequently, the population greatly increased. Likewise, a mass market of efficient and eco-friendly products would again lead to a massive amount of poison and waste, with disposed crude materials hardly being recycled. The ecological costs then would have to be externalised, which Sturm and Vogt (2011) regard as strong evidence of the failure of the market. The core problem hence lies in the fact that products are being produced exclusively for the technosphere (McDonough and Braungart, 2013). E.g., copper is almost universally applicable to and beneficial for technological systems, while in biological systems, this material is extremely poisonous. Thus, the aim must be to design products in a way that makes them equally usable in biosphere, i.e. subsequent to their technical usage. This calls for the development of a combined management of nutrients for techno- and biosphere. Human ways of living, the processes and products they are based on, may thereby be employed for the benefit of nature. The focus must therefore be put on those innovations that break up the present paradigm of environmental protection by realising products that create a useful material connection between techno- and biosphere. An example of this kind of creative destruction is the Austrian company Gugler, the first print shop worldwide that produces printing products free from harmful ingredients and exclusively with substances that can be biologically recycled (Gugler GmbH, 2018). E.g., the accruing sludge is returned to biosphere and the ash of burned printing products can be reused as a fertilizer. These conditions provide the possibility of designing economic activities to be ecologically compatible despite a high resource throughput.

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## Technofuturism

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#### Only current structures of capitalist governance can address warming – they make the arg for us on case – can’t change systems of power within the limited time we have.

Aronoff & Denvir 21 [Kate, staff writer at the New Republic, writing fellow at In These Times, Daniel, visiting fellow in International and Public Affairs at Brown Univ, “Capitalism Can’t Fix the Climate Crisis,” *Jacobin*, 08/25/21, <https://jacobinmag.com/2021/08/capitalism-climate-crisis-global-green-new-deal-clean-energy-fossil-fuel-industry>, accessed 08/26/21, JCR]

DD: You write: “My argument in this book is not that capitalism has to end before the world can deal with the climate crisis. Dismantling a centuries-old system of production and distribution, and building a carbon-neutral and worker-owned alternative, is almost certainly not going to happen within the small window of time the world has to avert runaway disaster. The private sector will be a major part of the transition off of fossil fuels. Some people will get rich, and some unseemly actors will be involved. Capitalist production will build solar panels, wind turbines, and electric trains. But whether we deal with climate change or not can’t be held hostage to executives’ ability to turn a profit. To handle this crisis, capitalism will have to be replaced as society’s operating system, setting out goals other than the boundless accumulation of private wealth.” This argument provoked a bit of controversy in the audience a few years back in Chicago when we discussed it on a panel at the Socialism Conference. Both of us would love to live in a socialist world, and we’ve got to continue to fight for one. But why do you think that it’s important for people to understand that we need to deal with climate change before we win an entirely new mode of production? What’s entailed by the conclusion that we need to pursue radical social-democratic reforms on the road to socialism? Is this a theory of how radical social-democratic reforms can lead to socialism? Is it just a reality that the fast-ticking climate clock imposes on us? Or is it some of both? KA: It’s a reality. If the climate crisis were playing out over the course of two hundred, three hundred, or a thousand years, one could have an interesting theoretical debate about whether we should change the system we have and tweak it slightly in order to take on the crisis, or whether we should create an entirely new mode of production and build up a workaround alternative. Unfortunately, we just don’t have that time. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] outlined in its 2018 report on 1.5 degrees Celsius that we had roughly twelve years. That is now nine years in which to rapidly decarbonize the global economy, which is an enormous challenge. In order to meet that ever-shrinking twelve-year window, we have to use the productive system in which we live — which is not my ideal situation, but then again, neither is global warming.

### Link Debate

#### The pessimism of the Aff is a self-fulfilling prophecy – progressive idealism that uses liberal democratic institutions to win broad public support for transformative change is key

Karlsson 13 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “Ambivalence, irony, and democracy in the Anthropocene,” *Futures*, http://bit.ly/2lCoG1N]

When confronted by, one hand, the unsustainable nature of existing socioeconomic arrangements and, on the other, the radicalism of any meaningful alternative, one possible response is to retreat into post-modern irony (Behler, 1990; Szerszynski, 2007:343). As all irony, it is a stance which requires minimal personal engagement. Instead of taking active responsibility for the future and trying to articulate intelligent ways of moving society forward, such an ironic stance is often characterized by apathy and resignation about the prospects of liberal democracy. While this apathy may be the result of everything from Marxists beliefs about the impossibility of political comprise to neoliberal opposition towards democratic agency, the result is surprisingly similar. For one reason or the other, the idea of radical democratic change is rejected and replaced with irony and political procrastination. Instead of idealism we find a growing cynicism, a cynicism which in itself is then often used to prove the impossibility of idealism. While passivity towards the future is nothing new (prior to the Enlightenment, it was in many ways the default orientation), it is in a way a paradoxical stance given how profoundly humanity has proven capable of reshaping its own social conditions over the last couple of centuries. Much has been written about why we, despite all the evidence of the opposite, have come to in this manner lose faith in our ability to democratically shape the future (Johnson, 2004; Nassehi, 1994). Beyond all elaborate attempts to explain the exhaustion of our utopian energies, a very simple answer could be a genuine lack of political imagination. While there is definitely no shortage of radical ideas per se, what is missing is convincing socioeconomic theories and intelligent stories about how to make transformative change possible in a pluralist world. Instead of developing such new unifying theories capable of winning broad democratic support, many academics have been drawn into critical theory in a way that has undermined their own ability to draw qualitative political distinctions and left them simply convinced that “the whole is false” (Bronner, 1999:181). Outside academia, conspiracy theories and other alternative epistemologies have come to play a similar role in undermining political subjectivity and the sense of collective responsibility for the future. While it is true that the Enlightenment itself always advocated moderation and toleration with its sceptical attacks on all human presumptions (just think of Voltaire), it was still founded on an unfailing commitment to social progress and the advancement of human civilization. Lacking that progressive commitment, many contemporary social theorists seem to rather take pride in their own marginalization and the futility of their “resistance” against the neoliberal hegemony.